The (Neglected) Employment Dimension of the World Trade Organization
Steve Charnovitz* A key assumption underlying the World Trade Organization (WTO) is that its program of trade negotiations will "strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the world."
1 Indeed, that was the first point included in the Marrakesh Declaration of April 1994 that consummated the Uruguay Round and established the WTO. In my view, the WTO truly is strengthening the "world economy" 2 and promoting trade and investment in many parts of the world. 3 Yet the rest of the thesis is debatable. Is it necessarily true that the WTO and the trade negotiations it sponsors are increasing employment and income growth throughout the world? Indeed, even aggregating the world economy into one planetary unit, one wonders whether increased trade (and its ensuing dynamic efficiencies) inevitably increases the Such questions underlie the subject of this article-the neglected employment dimension of the WTO. As a non-economist, I do not propose to answer these questions empirically. Instead, the purpose of this article is to point out how little the WTO does to monitor these issues or to design trade rules with sensitivity to the objective of employment growth. So far, the WTO has not set any quantitative goals for income or employment growth. The trade ministers have alluded to their desire that the WTO promote the "benefit and welfare of their peoples," 5 but the ministers are lackadaisical about keeping WTO negotiations on schedule. In view of the broad nature of international trade law today, the WTO seems to be overlooking many opportunities to promote a positive employment agenda.
This article proceeds in four parts: Part I reviews the WTO's actions, and inactions, on the issue of employment. Part I also provides an overview of the employment-related provisions of WTO law. Part II provides an historical context for thinking about the status of employment issues in the WTO. Part III presents an agenda for incorporating an employment and social dimension into the work of the WTO. Part IV concludes.
I. The WTO and Employment Policy
In its first decade, the WTO did not show much sensitivity toward the plight of the workers of the world who produce goods and perform services being traded. Aside from occasional strikes by
The Preamble to the WTO Agreement affirms that trade and economic relations should be conducted with a view to achieving listed goals, including "ensuring full employment . . ."
11
, and yet little attention to employment was institutionalized into the operative provisions of the treaty. Unfortunately, that provision takes a narrow view of "coherence" in global economic policymaking, and does not give consideration to employment policymaking. Of course, the WTO Agreement does affirm that the WTO General Council "shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO."
13
That mandate is sufficient to justify cooperative arrangements with the ILO. But so far the General Council has not sought or agreed to such an arrangement.
The neglect of employment issues within the WTO seems likely to persist. The WTO website explains that "there is no work" on the subject of labor standards being carried out at the WTO and it would be "wrong" to assume that this subject lies ahead. 14 This statement refers to labor standards, however, and not to the broader issue of employment. Yet with very limited exceptions, the same 11 See WTO Agreement, Preamble, para. 2. The language about full employment was lifted directly from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) written in 1947. In its decision in the Tariff Preferences case, the Appellate Body stated that the Preamble "informs" all WTO covered agreements. European Communities -Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 161 (adopted 20 April 2004).
Secretariat warns that "employment protection policies" may "discourage entrepreneurs from hiring the few workers needed for starting up a new company . trading system. The two authors make no claim that trade liberalization increases employment. 26 Instead, they focus on the pockets of industry and job displacement and point out that the adjustment costs from trade liberalization are likely to be small relative to the gains from trade. The Study provides a thoughtful handbook of the various policies available to governments to address these adjustment costs. Oddly, most of the attention in the 60-page study is directed to trade policies for delaying adjustment, such as WTO transition and phase-in periods, regular safeguards, special agricultural and textile safeguards, and antidumping duties. By contrast, the option of facilitating positive worker adjustment is squeezed into three pages.
One of the most perceptive observations in the study is that aid for dislocated workers can include both (1) short-run assistance to facilitate adjustment and achieve efficiency and (2) long-run equity transfers to compensate workers for income losses. The Study goes on to explain that tensions exist between these distinct objectives. 27 As someone who worked in the United States on the worker assistance problem for many years, I believe that this particular insight has often not been appreciated by analysts who criticize shortcomings in achieving one of these objectives without paying due attention to the other.
This mild praise for the Study's contributions on worker adjustment should be leavened by a brief recital of the Study's weaknesses. First, it is more of a literature review than a real study, and the literature reviewed is drawn mainly from trade economists. Second, the Study is not detailed enough to provide help to a WTO Member government attempting to design programs to assist workers who lose their jobs as a result of trade. Third, although the authors note that the costs of 26 Id. at 18.
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Id. at 23, 31 Another thoughtful observation is that making trade commitments in the WTO enhances the credibility of reform efforts and signals to the factors of production that adjustment will be necessary. Id. at 39-40. adjustment will often be four percent or less of the gains from trade, 28 the Study makes no effort to consider how to channel more of these net gains into aiding dislocated workers.
So far, this article has pointed out how little the WTO has done on the topic of employment.
To be sure, the WTO was set up to be a trade agency, not a labor agency. Nevertheless, one should recognize that the issue of employment is already embedded to a limited extent in WTO rules, and so the WTO does have some jurisdictional competence on employment.
Employment Aspects of Current WTO Rules
The Id. art. 27.13. 38 Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, para. 2(c).
support employment policy. For example, the rules against export subsidies prohibit the remission of "social welfare" charges upon exportation. 39 For domestic subsidies, a complaining government cannot claim that a subsidy in one country is displacing or impeding its exports to a third country when the complaining country has suffered strikes affecting its exports. 40 Initially, the SCM Agreement removed its disciplines on subsidies for a disadvantaged region suffering a spike in unemployment. 41 But that forbearance expired in 2000, and so high unemployment is no longer a justification for a subsidy.
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Note that all government subsidies for workers or for social costs will be subject to the control of the Byrd Amendment decision. the competence of foreign professionals. 45 The GATS directs governments, wherever appropriate, to work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations toward "the establishment and adoption of common international standards" for the practice of service trades and professions. 46 The GATS forbids limitations on the total number of natural persons "that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ . . . " when such limitations are in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test.
47
Furthermore, the labor market is central to GATS because two of the four modes for trade in services can involve the movement of people. 48 Mode 2 is the movement of individuals (and companies) to consume services in another country (e.g., training). Mode 4 is the movement of "natural persons" (i.e., individuals) to deliver services in another country (e.g., anti-terrorism services).
The precise boundary of Mode 4 is yet to be delineated or adjudicated. According to the GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement, the movement of employees is covered, but the GATS does not apply to measures affecting persons "seeking access to the employment market" and does not apply to measures regarding "employment on a permanent basis." 49 These provisions are puzzling because a worker who relocates to another country as an employee of a company may not be searching for a job, and yet is still statistically part 45 GATS art. VI:6 (in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken). of the employment market of the receiving country. 50 Another unknown is whether the "employment market" includes the self-employed who may offer various labor services.
Mode 4 of the GATS applies to national law governing entrance into a country (i.e., often termed "immigration"), the issuance of visas, and the administration of visa quotas. This is implicitly
shown by the Annex's specific exclusion of measures regarding citizenship and residence, 51 and by the statement in the Annex that GATS "shall not prevent a Member from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Member under the terms of a specific commitment." 52 In other words, if immigration measures necessary to protect border integrity are applied so as to impair specific commitments, then such measures can violate the GATS. The applicability of the GATS to visas is further clarified by the footnote to Paragraph 4 of the Annex which states that: "The sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of certain Members and not for those of others shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits under a specific commitment." 53 What this means is that the mere existence of a country-specific visa formality (perhaps due to reciprocity) is not in itself to be considered a nullification of benefits.
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In other words, she has access already even though she is not seeking access. For example, consider a transnational corporation that provides childcare services to residents in the United States through the use of foreign service suppliers who are already employed by the corporation and therefore arguably not seeking access to the U.S. labor market. The reality is that such a person operates in the U.S. labor market.
51
Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services Under the Agreement, para. 2. 52 Id. para. 4 (footnote omitted). 53 Id. at n. 13.
Notwithstanding constitutional authority to do so, 54 the GATS Council, to my knowledge, has not consulted with the most relevant international organizations on employment and migration regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Mode 4 provisions. Those organizations are the ILO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However the provisions are interpreted, it seems likely that the GATS will lead to a greater movement of workers across borders and some of those workers will decide to stay permanently.
Summary
In summary, during its first decade, the WTO missed numerous opportunities to solidify a constructive employment dimension. 
II. The Awakening of Social Awareness in Trade Policy
As always, the beginning of wisdom in thinking about the future is looking to the past. Both Adam Smith and Karl Marx shared an understanding that international trade has significant social implications, with Smith criticizing the pathologies of protection and Marx praising the revolutionary potential of free trade. 56 In the interwar period, the first ILO Director, Albert Thomas, offered a visionary synthesis of an emerging "world economy" and "new economic organisation" in which labor protections and free trade are complementary. The efforts of the League of Nations against economic instability helped to enlighten pragmatic policymakers regarding the interplay between trade and employment. In 1927, the World Economic Conference made several recommendations on trade policy and also gave some attention to rationalization in industry as a means of improving the conditions of labor. 59 In 1939, the Bruce Committee observed the phenomenon of physical, economic, and moral contagion among countries, and emphasized the need for international cooperation and coordination through "mutual help," "exchange of knowledge," and "association in the work of independent experts," in contrast to the 56 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) emphasized that liberalization could strengthen the economy so that more employment could be achieved.
66 Australia was the leading exponent of international undertakings on employment.
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The ensuing Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) put employment first with a chapter on "Employment and Economic Activity." The core commitment was for each member government to "take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment and large and steadily growing demand within its own territory through measures appropriate to its political, economic and social institutions." 68 Furthermore, the ITO was authorized to initiate consultations among governments for appropriate measures against the international spread of a decline in employment, production or demand. 69 The Employment chapter also included Article 7 on "Fair Labour Standards" that provided for dispute settlement regarding unfairly low standards in another country. 70 Recognizing the interconnections between the ITO and the ILO, the two organizations drafted a cooperation agreement in 1948.
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The broad intended scope of the ITO is apparent not only in the ITO's chapter on "Employment and Economic Activity", but also in its chapters on "Economic Development and For better or worse, the ITO did not come to fruition. Happily, the same U.N. negotiations spawned the GATT which served as a caretaker for world trade order over the next four decades.
Perhaps in an effort to distance itself from the broad aspirations for the ITO, the GATT stayed away from employment policy. Unfortunately, the low-wage developing countries seeking to export their cotton and other apparel have been stymied for over 40 years because the GATT/WTO system has not been ready to accept the comparative advantage of those countries.
76 Indeed, even today, some industrial countries use high tariffs to thwart such trade. For example, the U.S. government imposes 15 percent tariffs on many cotton products and 25 percent tariffs on many wool products.
In 1996, the WTO ministers pointed to ILO's standards as a possible threat to the export aspirations of developing countries. 77 This statement dripped in irony because the blame for the protectionism of the past 40 years cannot be attributed to labor standards or to the ILO. Instead of isolating itself from the ILO, WTO should recognize that the ILO can help it overcome national fears about import competition.
III. A Positive Employment Agenda for the WTO
The most important contribution the WTO can make to raising standards of living would be to tear down the protectionist walls between economies. Liberalizing trade is hardly sufficient for achieving human dignity and other social goals of the community. But trade liberalization is a constructive policy in an interdependent world economy because it typically increases purchasing power in each country. Although the GATT and WTO have done a lot to remove protection, a great deal more remains to be done-particularly in developing countries that have the greatest need for an 76 The WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing does not assert that the exports of developing countries being limited are unfair. Therefore, the motivation for keeping import quotas from 1995 to 2005 presumably was that the WTO was not ready to accept the comparative advance of low-wage countries.
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The WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration states that "We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question." WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 13 December 1996, para. 4, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm>. As I pointed out after the Singapore Conference, the WTO ministers did not need labor standards for protectionist purposes because they were using trade measures for that self-defeating function. economic boost from trade. Quite perversely, the developing countries are often the most resistant to liberalization.
Protectionism is not an effective or ethical response to any market failure; instead, it is a manifestation of government failure as politically powerful rent-seeking interests are requited with border restrictions. 78 Although trade ministers can agree to a rhetorical rejection of protectionism, 79 many of them remain eager to partake at home. Eradicating protectionism is a difficult political challenge for governments, and so the WTO should welcome outside offers to help.
Although the WTO epistemic community tends to look at employment as an output generated by trade negotiations, this view is incomplete in two respects. First, it fails to consider that high levels of employment within countries may be a necessary input for successful trade negotiations. That insight animated the founders of the postwar trading system who wrote the Employment chapter of the ITO Charter. Second, the current WTO program fails to consider the ways in which WTO rules may interfere with using employment policy at the national level to counter market failures and to increase investment in human capital. The WTO also fails to consider ways in which its cooperation with other international organizations, such as the ILO, could help those organizations achieve their own functional objectives.
Worker Adjustment Assistance
A recognition that governmental assistance to workers can be a complementary policy to trade liberalization goes back to the first half of the 20th century, but has not yet emerged in an intergovernmental treaty. So far, only soft law exists. In 1976, at the World Employment Conference, the governments, workers, and employers agreed to a Declaration which, among many points, states that governments should provide worker adjustment assistance "in order to facilitate the 78 Smith, supra note 56, chap. ii. He takes note of the way that "partial interests" direct and intimidate the legislature, moving it away from the general good. help all workers who suffer from structural unemployment. Another issue is whether adjustment programs are worth the public monies being spent on them. Although a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this article, let me briefly offer my own views. If governments undertook active labor market programs for all workers who needed them, then there would be no need for categorical programs for trade-affected workers. Conversely, when generally-available programs are absent or spotty (which is the condition in nearly all countries), the ideal of treating workers equally is not a good reason to refrain from some groups of workers. In other words, do not let the best be the enemy of the good. 
A WTO Decision on Trade and Employment
As a focal point for its new efforts, the WTO should enact a Decision on Trade and Employment to better institutionalize the employment issue in WTO policy. Such a Decision could include one or more of the following specifics:
Restate the principle from the ITO Charter 92 that the avoidance of unemployment is not of domestic concern alone, but is also a condition for achieving the general purposes of the trading system. Exhort WTO Members to establish programs to assist dislocated workers and propose that appropriate international organizations-such as the ILO and the World Bankpromote informational hubs and technical assistance for counseling, retraining, mobility assistance, and wage insurance. Governments need help in knowing what the better practices are. The Decision might recall the endorsement of adjustment programs by the World Summit for Social Development. 93 Propose that the World Bank set up a fund for developing countries to assist them in providing adjustment aid to workers dislocated by globalization. The Decision might recall that the idea of such international funding originated at the World Employment Conference in 1976.
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Propose that an independent mechanism be set up to collect data on the efficacy of national adjustment programs and to evaluate those programs, and then to put those results on the WTO website.
Propose that experimentation in social safety nets be encouraged through an international prize to be awarded to the most innovative and successful programs.
Hold GATS negotiations to lower barriers to trade in worker adjustment services. 95 If service deliverers see a large international market in delivering such services to 92 See ITO Charter, supra note 68, art. 2.1.
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World Summit for Social Development, Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development, para. 52(g), available at <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/index.html>. 94 Declaration, supra note 80, para. 71. Jagdish Bhagwati has endorsed this idea. Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 235.
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All four GATS modes are relevant here.
workers, more providers will get involved and their performance will be strengthened through competition.
Expand the WTO research program and direct the WTO to work with the ILO and the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development to examine the impact of trade on the quantity and quality of employment, and the gender implications of this impact. 96 The Decision might recall that this recommendation for joint research was made by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization.
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Establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment. 98 The Committee should be asked to examine whether WTO rules unduly constrain adjustment programs and national employment promotion policies. The Decision should invite the ILO to participate in the new Committee through a tripartite delegation. The Committee should also formulate measurable objectives for the WTO regarding world employment growth.
Consider the advisability of amending GATT rules to allow any country to impose a small uniform fee on imports for the purpose of using the revenue from such a fee to fund programs for adjustment assistance.
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In my view, the remit of a WTO Committee on Trade and Employment should be limited to these issues and should not include the two controversial topics discussed below-worker migration and fair labor standards. Attention to the temporary movement of workers is one of the most positive features of the GATS. So far, the commitments made by governments have been meager. 103 Perhaps the ongoing 100
To be sure, both issues relate to the trade and employment linkage. Nevertheless, I would exclude them for pragmatic reasons. The trade-related aspects of worker migration is a GATS issue and should be addressed by the WTO Council for Trade in Services or its subsidiary bodies. The issue of fair labor standards is very controversial in the WTO and any proposal to authorize a committee to consider it would doom that proposal to failure. The author is under no delusion as to the political likelihood that the WTO would actually set up a Committee on Trade and Employment. But I want the opponents to have to articulate why such a Committee is not appropriate for the WTO without having the easy retort that the WTO should not deal with fair labor standards. Because the nations of the world have a common interest in improving labor standards, they also share an interest in assuring that the WTO and the ILO work cohesively. The linkages are numerous: Emancipating international trade will increase productivity which should tend to raise labor standards. Improving labor conditions in countries notorious for worker rights abuses will make it easier for those countries to export to consumers who care about the condition of the workers making the goods they buy. 117 Raising worker productivity will expand output and enable countries to better compete in trade. These potential synergies need to be developed in a way that will allow the trade regime to help the labor regime.
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WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 77, para. 4. See TBT Agreement, Annex 1, paras. 1 & 2 (referring to "related" processes and production methods). 124 For example, GATS arts. V bis, VII:5, XIX:2 (attaching conditions), XVIII (additional commitments).
could be expanded to cover market-supportive regulation regarding labor policies.
125 His proposal suggests a WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Worker Agency Services to cover freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.
If labor standards do not come into the WTO as a discrete trade issue, they may come in instead as a "human rights" issue. Because the United States has never pressed for its inclusion into the WTO, human rights does not carry the same baggage that labor rights carries. To be sure, the WTO member governments that have been so defensive about worker rights, such as India, might be similarly antagonistic to human rights as a trade goal. But given the commitment within the United Nations and in many countries to the primacy of human rights, one cannot easily predict the outcome of a concerted effort to add a human rights dimension to the WTO. In recent years, many analysts have written about human rights as a WTO issue in a favorable light. 126 Others decry the idea of taking human rights into account at the WTO preferring to limit the arenas in which human rights can be pursued. How this tension plays out will be interesting to watch. It may be that when the issue of 125 core labor standards eventually enters the WTO, it does so under the banner of human rights, rather than as a distinct objective.
127

IV. Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the WTO adopt a durable employment dimension and to propose key elements for it. The Preamble of the WTO makes a bow to "ensuring full employment," but none of the actual rules drafted during the Uruguay Round do anything concrete to achieve this goal. Expanding the level of international trade may increase worker remuneration and purchasing power, but trade is a blunt instrument for governments to use to combat structural unemployment and chronic poverty.
Instead, governments need to use appropriate employment policy. The difficulty, however, is that because of perceived international competition, governments may not implement the employment and labor policies that would be optimal for them. Similarly, dysfunctions in employment policy can hinder trade negotiations. Because of perceived unfairness in trade due to horrible labor conditions in some countries, governments may resist the acceptance of goods produced under such conditions. Because of labor market failures that prevent redundant workers from getting reemployed, governments may drag their feet in implementing trade liberalization.
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Furthermore, WTO rules on subsidies may encroach on the policy space needed by governments.
The existence of these international interactions between trade and labor provide the justification for a comprehensive international policy to manage the trade-labor connection. One element is to prevent WTO rules from interfering with legitimate labor policy at the national level.
Another is maintain a proper balance between economic and social factors of development. Another is to promote the employment and social preconditions for trade liberalization. Not all aspects of such 127 See Philip Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
For example, in the early 2000s, the Bush Administration imposed heavy tariffs on steel and endorsed new subsidies for U.S. farmers. policies need to be addressed within the WTO, but even the ones outside the WTO's competence might benefit from some WTO involvement.
Twenty years ago, I observed that jobs were replacing gold as the modern measure of a favorable balance of trade.
129 What I meant was that poor outcomes in the labor market would become more of a constraint on the ability of governments to liberalize. 130 I was not suggesting that only exports create jobs, or that imports always destroy jobs. If such effects actually occurred, that would turn the trade equation into a zero-sum employment game. Surely that view of trade ignores both theory and reality.
Looking back, my observation was a tad too pessimistic. In the intervening years, many governments have liberalized trade, often in the face of high unemployment. Nevertheless, a great deal more liberalization remains to be accomplished in the years ahead.
Poor domestic and international policies on employment creation will continue to be a drag on the ability of governments and societies to embrace the benefits of trade liberalization. To remedy this situation, the WTO should admit that the aspirations about employment in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement cannot be satisfactorily achieved without the use of social policy instruments at both the domestic and the international levels. As a first step, the WTO's shadowy employment dimension should be better developed so that the WTO works with other international agencies to help countries recover from globalization-induced unemployment.
Just as international trade policy is too important to be left to the WTO, international employment policy is too important to be left to the ILO (or to meetings of the G-8 Labor and Employment Ministers). In my view, the WTO itself has a complementary role to play. Furthermore, 129 See Charnovitz, supra note 87, at 170. 130 This is especially true in the United States where President Bush (according to one of his aides) "strongly opposes any treaty or policy that would cause the loss of a single American job." See Putin Signs Kyoto Protocol-What's Next?, 15 Business and the Environment (1 December 2004) at 4. governments need to enhance the coordination of multilateral organizations so that interconnected economic and social goals can be integrated and promoted more successfully. The world community took up this task 60 years ago in the establishment of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (at the suggestion of the Bruce Committee). Sadly, the integration of social and economic objectives remains in its infancy. Going forward, such integration will also need to take account of environmental objectives.
In discerning the right path forward, governments and stakeholders can benefit by learning That's a good motto for the ILO and would be a good motto for the WTO. 132 In the 21st century, let us renew global efforts to achieve those timeless aspirations. 131 Thomas, supra note 57, at 12.
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To my knowledge, the WTO does not have an organizational motto.
